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1. Introduction
1.1. Self – Definitions and concepts
The concept of self is notoriously difficult to define and different notions and theories of the
self have been proposed by a variety of disciplines all interpreting concepts of self and iden‐
tity in various ways. We adopt the definition advanced by neuroscientists Kircher and Da‐
vid [1] who interpret the self as ‘the commonly shared experience, that we know we are the
same person across time, that we are the author of our thoughts/actions, and that we are dis‐
tinct from the environment’ (p.2). In cognitive neuroscience literature, operational defini‐
tions of the self are used which are measurable by experimental methods including self
recognition, self and other differentiation, body awareness, awareness of other minds,
awareness of self as expressed in language and important concepts such as autobiographical
memory and self narrative. There is significant interest in the role of the self and possible
abnormalities associated with the self, as causally implicated in autism. In this paper we re‐
view developmental perspectives of self and self-related functions with reference to their
neuroanatomical basis and investigate the possible causes for atypical self-development in
Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD).
2. Review of studies investigating the self in ASD
The question whether individuals with ASD have a different sense of self than people with‐
out ASD, i.e. ‘neurotypicals’ has fascinated researchers and clinicians for decades. Kanner
[2] in 1943 already noted self-deficits in the children he described, including their difficulties
in maintaining a constant self-concept, and associated problems of adapting their fragile
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self-concept to changing environments. Asperger [3] (1974, p. 2026) refers to a disturbance
and a weakness of the self in children with ‘autistic psychopathy’. Psychoanalytic theories
considered autism as a disorder of the self [4] based on the lack of ability in establishing sta‐
ble internal representations of themselves and of others. The German psychiatrist Lutz [5]
(1968) interpreted autism as a disturbance of self-consciousness, self-related activities and
self-perception. Powell and Jordan [6] (1993) suggested that individuals with ASD lack an
‘experiencing self’ that provides a personal dimension for ongoing events. This is consistent
with Frith’s [7] suggestion of an ‘absent self’ in autism. Hobson [8] put forward a develop‐
mental account of the self in autism emphasising impaired interpersonal relatedness, ‘inter‐
subjectivity’ and its far-reaching consequences for the development of the self. In a recent
study investigating whether children with autism show abnormal self-other connectedness,
Hobson and Meyer [9] found a failure in autism to identify with another person. These au‐
thors suggest that this process of identifying with others is crucial for a normal development
of self-other relationship and the basis for understanding other minds.
3. Atypical development of self-related processes in ASD
There is general consensus among developmental theorists [e.g. 10,11] that early interper‐
sonal communication is central to the establishment of the self in normal development. A
large  body  of  research  literature  indicates  that  early  processes  underlying  self-other
awareness  are  impaired  or  delayed  in  autism  including  gaze  following,  abnormal  re‐
sponse to sound and deficits in attention [12], showing of objects, responding and orient‐
ing  to  own  name  [13],  looking  at  other’s  faces  [14],  pretend  play,  protodeclarative
pointing and gaze monitoring [15], empathy and imitation [16], joint-attention behaviour
[17], affect and personal relatedness [18,19].
3.1. Self recognition and awareness
The ability to recognize one’s own face in the mirror is considered a test for ‘self-aware‐
ness’.  Self-recognition  as  measured  by  mirror  tests  [20]  in  18  months  old  children  has
been depicted as a developmental milestone in self-conception and described as the ‘ach‐
ievement of a cognitive self’ [21]. Not only is self recognition essential for developing a
concept of self, and self-other differentiation, it is also a prerequisite for later developing
theory of  mind abilities,  as  a  stable  self  concept  is  the  basis  for  being able  to  read the
mental  states  of  others.  Research data  on self-recognition reveals  that  autistic  children’s
responses to their mirror images are qualitatively different from those of normal children
[22].  Children  with  ASD have  deficits  of  self-awareness  as  measured  by  a  self-recogni‐
tion test [23] they show little interest in their own mirror images and have been descri‐
bed as relatively ‘face inexperienced’ [24].
The  prefrontal  cortex,  especially  the  Right  Hemisphere  (RH)  plays  a  critical  role  in  the
recognition of one’s own face [25] as evidenced by functional imaging studies. Face per‐
ception  studies  in  individuals  with  ASD  suggest  abnormal  functioning  in  the  fusiform
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face area as well as amygdala, brain regions associated with the ‘social brain’ (e.g. 26,27]
involving the RH.
3.2. Self/other differentiation
The ability to differentiate between self and other is also essential for the development of
self-awareness, which appears to be impaired in autism. In particular, the recognition of a
separate existence of other people seems to be delayed in children with autism [28,29]. At‐
tentional abnormalities, such as ‘tunnel vision’, the tendency to think in a monotropic man‐
ner have been suggested by some as the cause of ‘self-other problems’ in ASD [30]. Donna
Williams [31] interprets monoprocessing as the inability to process simultaneously informa‐
tion of oneself and others.
In neurotypicals the middle cingulate cortex and ventromedial prefrontal cortex are in‐
volved in self/other processing. In contrast, atypical neural responses have been reported in
individuals with ASD. A recent fMRI study [32] investigating the attribution of behavioural
outcomes to either oneself or others while playing an interactive trust game revealed a lack
of brain activity in the cingulate cortex indicating diminished ‘self responses’ in individuals
with ASD. However, ‘other responses’, attributing actions to other people were intact. Previ‐
ous research data using trust games [33] had demonstrated that cingulate cortex activation
is consistent with self-response patterns generated during interpersonal exchanges. Chiu et
al. [34] interpreted their data in terms of a deficit in ASD in monitoring their own intentions
in social interactions and thus contributing to impaired theory of mind abilities, lack of in‐
trospection and self-referential processing. Of particular interest is the fact that the ‘im‐
paired self-responses’ in the ASD group correlated with their behavioural symptom
severity, i.e. the lesser activity along cingulated cortex the more serious were their behaviou‐
ral symptoms. Similar results have been reported by Lombardo et al. [35] also demonstrat‐
ing atypical neural responses from the middle cingulate cortex during a self-referential
processing task. This study also provided a link between these deficits and early social im‐
pairments in autism. In addition, these authors also demonstrated reduced functional con‐
nectivity between ventromedial prefrontal cortex and lower level regions (e.g.
somatosensory cortex) in individuals with ASD during these self- representation tasks.
Previous studies identified the right inferior parietal lobe, along with frontopolar and soma‐
tosensory regions [36,37] as critical for distinguishing between self and other. Additional da‐
ta [e.g. 38] demonstrate that SI and SII cortices, which contribute to the mirror-neuron
system, are also crucial for preserving a sense of self.
3.3. Body awareness, sense of agency
Knowing oneself and knowing one’s body are closely related concepts. In his review on
body image and the self, Goldenberg [39] argues that the acquisition of body image is not
innate but acquired through experiences of one’s own and other bodies. Likewise, Jordan
and Powell [40] believe that a body concept develops from interacting with others. Anecdo‐
tal reports indicate that some children and adults with autism have an insecure body image
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or totally lack body awareness. Russell [41] suggested that the ’body schemas of persons
with autism are poorly specified’ resulting in an atypical experience of agency. A sense of
agency is a central aspect of human self-consciousness and refers to the experience of oneself
as the agent of ones actions. Based on his executive function account of impaired action
monitoring Russell [42] put forward the hypothesis that individuals with autism are im‐
paired in distinguishing between self and others. In contrast, a recent study by Williams and
Happè [43] suggests that individuals with ASD are aware of their agency as indicated by
their ability to monitor their own actions.
Support for a dominant role of the right hemisphere in the above processes is substantial.
The right posterior parietal lobe is generally associated with spatial and bodily awareness
[44,45]. Activation of right inferior parietal lobe correlates with a sense of ownership in ac‐
tion execution [46]. Additional research evidence [47] based on transcranial magnetic stimu‐
lation (TMS) supports the significance of the right temporo-parietal junction in the
maintenance of a coherent sense of one’s body.
3.4. Theory of mind, emotions and self-awareness
An essential component of self-awareness is the ability to be aware of other minds. A multi‐
tude of studies have provided evidence that theory of mind is lacking or delayed in ASD, or
develops differently than in neurotypicals [for a substantive review see 48]. Deficits in mind‐
reading may also affect the ability to reflect on one’s own mental states [49] resulting in di‐
minished self-awareness. There is some evidence suggesting that the ability to think about
one’s own thoughts depends on the same cognitive and neural processes as mindreading
[50]. Equally, emotions play an important role in self-awareness. The development of the ca‐
pacity to experience, communicate and regulate emotions is considered to be the most im‐
portant event in infancy [51]. One of the main characteristics of autism is lack of empathy
and emotional engagement with others [52,53]. Children with autism have difficulties with
interpreting emotions, are deficient in processing their own emotional experiences and pay
little attention to emotional stimuli in general [e.g. 54-57]. Due to this inability to empathize
and emotionally engage with others individuals with ASD are totally focussed on their own
interests and concerns.
A network of structures important for theory of mind processing includes the superior tem‐
poral sulcus and the adjacent temporo-parietal junction, the temporal poles and the medial
prefrontal cortex [58; see also 59 for a review). Research evidence implicated the RH in theo‐
ry of mind reasoning across various tasks [60, 61]. The neural substrates for emotions and
empathy are complex [62] involving amygdala, ventral medial prefrontal cortex. Recent
imaging studies point to an involvement of a ‘mirror neuron circuit’ for empathy [63,64].
3.5. Egocentrism/Allocentrism
In apparent contrast to the mentalizing impairment even among very high functioning indi‐
viduals with ASD is their often-documented increased sense of self or total focus on the self
[65,66,67] that is also reflected in numerous biographical accounts. The term ‘autism’ is de‐
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rived from the Greek word ‘autos’ (‘self’) and since Kanner’s time this focus on the self as
atypical applies to all individuals with ASD. Extreme egocentricity was one of the diagnostic
criteria for Asperger Syndrome proposed by Gillberg & Gillberg [68]. Frith and de Vigne‐
mont [69] suggest that there are differences to reading other minds depending on whether
the other person can be understood using an ‘egocentric’ or an ‘allocentric’ standpoint. From
an egocentric point of view other people are understood only relative to the self whereas
from an allocentric stance the mental state of a person is independent from the self. These
theorists suggest that individuals with ASD suffer from an imbalance between both point of
views, ‘they are unable to connect an egocentric to an allocentric stance and can only adopt
extreme forms of either’ [70]. This very detailed analysis of mindreading further illustrates
the different and unique aspects of awareness of self and others in individuals with ASD.
3.6. Self awareness across time
Awareness that we are the same person across time, also defined as temporally extended
self-awareness [71] is an essential part of one’s self-concept. Although the results of two re‐
cent studies [72,73] indicate that individuals with ASD have undiminished temporally ex‐
tended self-awareness as assessed by the delayed self-recognition task, this task may not
adequately measure self-awareness as suggested by Lind & Bowler [74]. Indirect evidence
suggests that temporally extended self-awareness is impaired in ASD based on their prob‐
lems with theory of mind as well as some aspects of temporal cognition [75]. Alternative ex‐
planations are the autobiographic memory difficulties [76] and also the well-documented
language impairments in ASD. Language is a medium with which we monitor ourselves
and it allows us to experience past, present and future [77].
3.7. Language and awareness of self
Conceptions about oneself and others develop from an early age and depend largely on the
emergence of language. At around 18 months of age children start referring to themselves as
‘I’ and begin using the word ‘you’ for others, indicating a further development in their self-
other awareness. According to Kircher and David [78] ‘the symbolic presentation of the self
in language is the personal pronoun I’. Language difficulties such as pronoun reversal, use
of third person perspective, impoverished inner speech, and impaired narrative have a neg‐
ative effect on mental processes and also restrict certain aspects of self-awareness.
There is substantial clinical and research evidence of impaired pragmatic language use in
children with ASD as indicated by pronoun reversal errors (‘I’/’me/’you’) [79-82] reflecting
general difficulties with their sense of self, as well as problems in self-other differentiation.
Peeters et al. [83] suggested that the reason children with autism sometimes communicate
from a third-person perspective instead of a first- vis-à-vis second person perspective is that
in contrast to typically developing children they possess a non-social basis of self-other cate‐
gorization. Use of a third person perspective also has consequences for attribution of mental
states, and mentalizing ability in general. As argued by Northoff and Heinzel [84] a third
person perspective is an indication of a fragmented image of self and other. Adults with
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ASD also appear to have difficulties with first person pronoun usage [85]. Of particular in‐
terest might be the fact, that Hans Asperger often used to refer to himself from a third per‐
son perspective [86].
A fundamental role in self-awareness is attributed to inner speech [87] that is impaired in
ASD [88]. When asked about the nature of their thoughts, a group of adults with Asperger
syndrome reported mainly images and actions as their only inner experience and made no
reference to inner speech or emotions [89]. Many individuals with ASD are visual thinkers
and rely heavily on visualization to process information [90].
A recent fMRI study [91]  provided evidence of  underintegration of  language and imag‐
ing in autism by showing that individuals with ASD are more reliant on visualization to
support  language  comprehension.  These  authors  suggest  that  cortical  underconnectivity
is the reason for the lack of synchronization between linguistic and imaginal processing
in autism.  Supporting these findings are  the results  of  an imaging study on daydream‐
ing [92] indicating that autistic individuals do not ‘daydream’ about themselves or other
people. This study also points to a link between daydreaming and the construction of self
and self-awareness.
In summary, language is of fundamental significance to self-awareness and necessary for
forming a clear identity of self and others. Another important dimension in the formation of
the self that is also dependent on language is autobiographical memory as well as the con‐
struct of a narrative self.
3.8. Autobiographical memory
Many influential theorists [93,94] associate the development of self with the emergence of
autobiographical  or episodic memory.  The components necessary for a fully functioning
autobiographical memory are a basic memory system, spoken or signed language, under‐
standing and production of narrative, temporal understanding, self-awareness and theory
of  mind [95].  Autobiographical  memory not  only depends on these cognitive constructs
but is also specifically concerned with events that have specific meaning to the individu‐
al.  This  personal  significance  evolves  through  emotions  and  motivations  that  are  con‐
structed  in  interaction  with  others.  Autobiographical  disturbances  can  arise  from
combined  deficits  in  the  realms  of  memory,  emotion  and  self-related  processing  which
are intricately connected, both behaviourally and neurologically [96].
The  majority  of  components  that  make  up  an  autobiographic  memory  system  are  im‐
paired in  autism.  There  is  significant  evidence  that  individuals  with  ASD have circum‐
scribed episodic  memory impairments,  e.g.  they  have  an  impaired  recall  for  personally
experienced events [97-101].  As suggested by Millward et al [102] individuals with ASD
remember real-life episodes less well than other people because they have no ‘experienc‐
ing self’. Wheeler et al [103] in their investigation of episodic memory in autism conclud‐
ed  that  remembering  of  personal  events  requires  the  ‘highest  form  of  consciousness,
autonoetic consciousness (self-knowing), which is dependent of self-awareness’.
Recent Advances in Autism Spectrum Disorders - Volume I754
The prevailing view is that episodic memory is created in the neocortex and subsequently
stored in the medial-temporal lobes and after a time becomes independent and is distribut‐
ed in neocortical networks [104]. Whereas the left temporal lobe is dominant for the acquisi‐
tion of new verbal information, episodic information involves mainly the right fontal lobes
[105, 106]. Neuroimaging studies provide evidence for right frontal involvement in the proc‐
essing of autobiographic memories [e.g. 107]. The RH is especially important for memories
with emotional contents.
3.9. The narrative self
Many theorists [e.g. 108, 109] have highlighted the importance of the narrative self and ar‐
gued that the autobiographical self is a similar construct as the narrative self. Individuals
create their own identity by constructing autobiographical narratives or life stories [110].
The benefits of a personal or narrative self are significant; a narrative mediates self-under‐
standing and creates coherence out of life’s experiences. Narrative emerges early in develop‐
ment and narrative and self are inseparable [111]. The creation of a narrative self depends on
various cognitive capacities, including working memory, self-awareness, episodic memory
and reflective metacognition, a sense of agency, the ability to attribute action to oneself to‐
gether with a capacity for temporal integration of events, a fully functioning pronoun sys‐
tem, an ability to differentiate between self and non-self as well as a sense of one’s own body
that is based on proprioceptive-motor processes [112].
The mechanisms responsible for each of the above dimensions are impaired in autism and
as a consequence individuals with ASD have great difficulties in constructing a self-narra‐
tive. If autobiographical material cannot be provided, the narrative is disoriented and con‐
fused and in many cases is no narrative at all but only confabulation [113], which is often the
case in autism. As a result, the narrative of individuals with ASD, and the self that is repre‐
sented in this narrative, is quite vague and not representing the true self. Research evidence
confirms deficits in narrative abilities in individuals with ASD [114-116].
Language and symbolic functions are localized in the left hemisphere, whereas narrative
abilities are considered to be a function of the right hemisphere. There is a significant evi‐
dence for RH contribution to social language and many of the functions associated with au‐
tobiographic memory specifically those with emotional contents. In addition, narrative
organisation depends on coordination of activity among various brain regions [117] and as
suggested by Belmonte [118] malfunction in neural connectivity may be the underlying
problem with autistic narrative.
To summarize, there is substantial evidence that the main components of self-awareness in‐
cluding self recognition, self-other differentiation, body awareness, theory of mind, inter‐
subjectivity, emotion processing, language (pronoun reversal, inner speech, third person
perspective), autobiographical memory and narrative self are impaired in ASD. Our review
of neural substrates underlying these processes has highlighted the significance of the Right
Hemisphere.
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4. Self neuropathology in ASD
From a neural point of view the self can be viewed as a complex and dynamic representa‐
tion consisting of multiple brain networks [119, 120]. The origins of self begin in infancy and
over the first several years of life normally developing children acquire an understanding of
different dimensions of self and other. Deviant development in autism is likely to result in a
cascade of developmental impairments including dysfunctional self-related processes as
outlined above. Various brain regions have been indicated in the pathogenesis of autism in‐
cluding frontal lobes [e.g., 121] cerebellum [122], parietal lobes [123], hippocampus [124] and
amygdala [125]. The extent of anatomical and functional abnormalities in autism points to a
possible core dysfunction in neural processing. In addition, the vast amount of potential ge‐
netic risk factors suggests that multiple or all-emerging functional brain areas are affected
during early development [126]. This theory is supported by widespread growth abnormali‐
ties in the brain of children with autism [127, 128].
In the following sections we will explore three neural theories implicated in the develop‐
ment of an atypical or different sense of self in individuals with ASD. Apart from the in‐
volvement  of  the  RH in  self-related processes  a  dysfunctional  mirror  neuron system as
well as abnormal connectivity may have a role to play in the atypical developmental tra‐
jectories in ASD.
4.1. Right hemisphere hypothesis
The prefrontal cortex plays a vital role in the development of the self as it generates a sense
of self and facilitates many links with other parts of the brain. Cognitive neuroscience stud‐
ies have shown that the RH plays a special role in personal relatedness, which is intimately
linked to the development of the self. Based largely on recent neuroimaging research evi‐
dence an increasing number of cognitive neuroscientists have emphasized the specific role
of the RH in self-related functions [129-132]. Specifically the right dorsomedial prefrontal
cortex seems to play a critical role in the development of models of the self [133]. This has
been confirmed by several imaging studies, including a recent study of self-evaluation [134].
As described in the previous paragraphs there is substantial research evidence that the RH
may be dominant for self-awareness and self-related functions. The psychiatrist and philoso‐
pher Iain McGilchrist [135] provided an extensive exploration of the dominance of the RH in
self-related processes.
Elsewhere, Lyons and Fitzgerald [136] put forward the theory that RH impairment leads to
a dysfunctional self-development in ASD. There is substantial research evidence linking As‐
perger syndrome to right hemisphere dysfunction [e.g. 137, 138]. The RH is dominant in the
first years of human life when the major brain development during critical periods takes
place. Results of a cerebral metabolism study in children (aged between 18 days to 12 years)
showed that the RH is prominently activated, suggesting that the RH develops earlier than
the LH [139]. The RH in implicated during early social interactions [140] including early at‐
tachment processes [141], maternal face and voice recognition [142] as well as the ability to
view others in a similar way as the self [143]. The developing self depends on relations with
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others and these early experiences are vital for the maturation of the right brain system. Sub‐
stantial behavioural evidence of infants who later developed autism is supporting the theo‐
ry of disrupted intersubjective behaviour. We argue that impairments in neurobiology
affecting particularly the RH both cause and interact with defects in personal relatedness
and later developing self processes.
4.2. Abnormal connectivity
The ‘Abnormal Neural Connectivity Theory’ proposes that autism is a distributed system-
wide brain disorder that restricts the coordination and integration among various brain
areas. The original positron emission tomography (PET) study by Horwitz et al. [144] found
reduced correlations among frontal cortex, parietal and other brain regions and suggested
that autism involves impairment in functional connectivity between frontal cortex and other
brain systems. More recent studies proposed that autism is a disorder of neural undercon‐
nectivity [145], overconnectivity [146, 147] or both under and overconnectivity in which lo‐
cal connectivity may be relatively dense whereas long-range connectivity between brain
regions may be reduced or abnormally patterned [146-151].
Studies of the cerebral cortex in autism show abnormalities of synaptic and columnar struc‐
ture. Cortical minicolumns are fundamental units of cerebral cortical information process‐
ing. Examination of neurons revealed abnormalities in the size of cortical minicolumns
particularly in the frontal and temporal lobes in ASD [152, 153] that could alter overall levels
of connectivity within the brain. These findings are in accordance with the observed white
matter abnormalities reported particularly in people with ASD [154]. A recent study using
functional connectivity MRI (fcMRI) [155] provided further evidence of atypical enhanced
functional connectivity suggesting that abnormal connectivity may be linked to develop‐
mental brain growth disturbances in autism.
These studies suggest that connectivity among diverse brain areas may be the core problem
in autism. In autism the network connectivity through which various brain areas communi‐
cate with each other are limited, particularly the connections to the frontal cortex [156]
which is dominant for self-related processing particularly in the RH. The network model of
the self proposed by Stuss et al. [157] suggests that the self is hierarchically organized, with
the highest level of the self involved in self-awareness being subserved by frontal lobes. Ear‐
ly developmental impairments in minicolumnar microcircuitry in the frontal cortex in au‐
tism could be the reason for the deficits found in higher order frontal processes [158] which
are likely to result in fragmented self awareness and identity formation in autism.
4.3. Mirror neuron system
Another recent neural theory of autism suggests that a dysfunctional mirror neuron system
may be fundamental to the aetiology of autism [159, 160]. The existence of mirror neurons in
humans has been demonstrated by a number of EEG and imaging studies [e.g. 161]. Mirror
neurons are activated in relation both to specific actions performed by self and matching ac‐
tions performed by others, providing a potential bridge between minds [162] and might
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have a role to play in self related processes. Mirror neurons may enable us to understand the
actions of others by mapping the actions of other people to our own motor system and so
allow a shared representation of actions. In addition to understanding the action of others
this so-called ‘mirroring’ might also allow the automatic experience of the intention and
emotion of the other person as suggested by Kaplan and Iacoboni [163].
Research has demonstrated that mirror neuron activity correlates with empathy [164] and
social competence in general [165]. It has been suggested that mirror neurons are a prerequi‐
site for the normal development of self-recognition, imitation, theory of mind, empathy, in‐
tersubjectivity and language [166, 167]. Furthermore, mirror neurons are likely to play a
central role in self-awareness. To quote Ramachandran and Oberman [168] ‘they may enable
humans to see themselves as others see them, which may be an essential ability for self-
awareness and introspection’ (p.41). Developmental data suggest that there is higher imita‐
tive behaviour in children that can self-recognise, possibly facilitated by mirror neurons, in
contrast to those who cannot [169]. Providing support for a RH hypothesis in self-related
functions are recent imaging studies [170, 171] indicating that a frontoparietal ‘mirror’ net‐
work is associated with self-recognition processes.
Several recent functional brain-imaging studies have found evidence of mirror neuron dys‐
function in individuals with ASD in social mirroring tasks [172], motor facilitation [173], and
imitation [174]. A fMRI study [175] revealed that individuals with autism showed a different
pattern of brain activity during cognitive tasks relating to self-referential processing. The au‐
thors concluded that a core deficit in autism might be related to the construction of a sense
of self in its relation with others. Echoing Hobson [176] Iacoboni [177] suggests that primary
intersubjectivity is the basis for the development of the neural systems associated with inter‐
nal and external self-related processes. Failure or abnormal development of a fully function‐
ing mirror neuron system in the autistic infant is likely to result in a cascade of
developmental impairments including dysfunctional self-related processes.
5. Conclusion
The centrality of an impaired sense of self in autism has been the focus of research for many
decades. The development of self-awareness is a complex process that involves integration
of information from many sources and coordination across the brain systems involved in
self-related concepts. A sense of self emerges from the activity of the brain in interaction
with other selves. There is substantial evidence that early deficits in self-development in‐
cluding impaired relations with others result in a fragmented and atypical sense of self in
ASD. In this review we have presented evidence that a great majority of self-related process‐
es that are mediated to a significant extent by the right hemisphere are impaired in individ‐
uals with ASD. Additional lines of investigation indicate that an unintegrated sense of self
in autism is also potentially associated with abnormal functional connectivity and an im‐
paired mirror neuron system. Consequences of this atypical sense of self are the well-docu‐
mented impairments individuals with ASD experience in the social and communication
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domain. In contrast, there have been suggestions that this different sense of self might be a
contributory factor to the significant talents and special skills present in a majority of indi‐
viduals with ASD. Happè & Vital [178] put forward the notion that diminished self-aware‐
ness in ASD might be advantageous in the development of these special gifts.
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